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Fraudulent Conveyance Law and
Its Proper Domain
Douglas G. Baird* & Thomas H. Jackson**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1571 Parliament passed a statute making illegal and void
any transfer made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or de-
frauding creditors.' This law, commonly known as the Statute of
13 Elizabeth, was intended to curb what was thought to be a wide-
spread abuse.2 Until the seventeenth century, England had certain
sanctuaries into which the King's writ could not enter. A sanctuary
was not merely the interior of a church, but certain precincts de-
fined by custom or royal grant. Debtors could take sanctuary in
one of these precincts, live in relative comfort, and be immune
from execution by their creditors. It was thought that debtors usu-
ally removed themselves to one of these precincts only after selling
their property to friends and relatives for a nominal sum with the
tacit understanding that the debtors would reclaim their property
after their creditors gave up or compromised their claims. The
Statute of 13 Elizabeth limited this practice.3
The basic prohibition of this statute, which prevents debtors
from making transfers that hinder, delay, or defraud their credi-
tors, has survived for over four centuries.4 A debtor cannot manip-
ulate his affairs in order to shortchange his creditors and pocket
the difference. Those who collude with a debtor in these transac-
*Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. B.A. 1975, Yale College; J.D. 1979, Stan-
ford University.
**Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.A. 1972, Williams College; J.D. 1975, Yale
University. We thank Frank Easterbrook, Frank Kennedy, and Robert Rasmussen for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571).
2. See 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 61-61e (rev. ed.
1940).
3. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). Because one-half of the property fraudulently conveyed was
forfeited to the Crown, the statute was also in part a revenue measure.
4. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571); see Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601). Today this basic
prohibition is contained in § 7 of the UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 205
(1918) and in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tions are not protected either. An individual creditor who discovers
his debtor's assets have been fraudulently conveyed can reduce his
claim to judgment and have the sheriff levy on the property that is
now no longer in the debtor's hands (as long as the property is not
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value).'
The difficulty that courts and legislatures have faced for hun-
dreds of years has been one of trying to define what kinds of trans-
actions hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.6 From very early on,
common law judges developed per se rules, known as "badges of
fraud," that would allow the courts to treat a transaction as a
fraudulent conveyance even though no specific evidence suggested
that the debtor tried to profit at his creditors' expense.1 For exam-
ple, common law judges assumed that an insolvent debtor who sold
property but retained possession of it without any special reason
(such as a need to complete unfinished goods) was up to no good."
Over the past hundred years, there has~been an increasing ten-
dency to treat transfers of property of insolvent debtors in which
the debtor received nothing or too little in return as fraudulent
conveyances. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, for exam-
ple, contains a separate section that deems a transfer by an insol-
vent debtor made for less than "fair consideration" to be a fraudu-
lent conveyance." The most straightforward justification for this
provision is the same as the justification for the Statute of 13 Eliz-
abeth: it is a rule designed to set aside transfers by an insolvent
debtor that are intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.
This approach presumes mischief when an insolvent debtor volun-
tarily transferred property and got nothing or clearly too little in
return10 unless the debtor simply was paying off an antecedent
5. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 304 (1918). The protection for
bona fide purchasers appears to be accorded to ensure the "negotiability" of goods. See
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954).
6. See, e.g., Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810-11 (K.B. 1601) (announcing six
"badges of fraud"); Philco Fin. Corp. v. Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41 (N.D. Miss. 1971)
(applying "badges of fraud").
7. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). This rule still
survives in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (West 1970) (sale of goods
without immediate and continued change of possession conclusively fraudulent).
9. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1918); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)(A) (1982) (authorizing bankruptcy trustee to set aside conveyance within prior
year as fraudulent conveyance if debtor received less than "reasonably equivalent value").
10. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 777-86 (1984);
see also McCoid, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Con-
sideration, 62 'rxx. L. REv. 639, 656-57 (1983) (doubting that inadequate consideration alone
justifies an inferende of "intentional fraud or voluntary gift").
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debt.11 Because it is a per se rule, it may treat some transactions in
which a debtor was not trying to hinder, delay, or defraud his cred-
itors as fraudulent conveyances. The number of cases in which an
insolvent debtor gives away something for nothing but is not trying
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, however, may be suffi-
ciently small that it is preferable to treat all these cases as fraudu-
lent conveyances. The benefits of a rule may warrant its supple-
menting the standard. The costs to society of setting aside
legitimate transfers should be offset by the elimination of costs as-
sociated with proving actual fraudulent intent in cases in which
the chances of fraud are very high.
If one begins with the premise that the provision covering
transactions made without fair consideration is simply a per se rule
that embodies the more general standard that a debtor cannot
transfer property if his purpose is to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors, the provision carries with it the limits imposed by its
origins. When the applicability of a statute is in doubt in a particu-
lar case, one must interpret its language in light of the purposes
that underlie it. Hence, in determining whether a transaction falls
within the prohibition of that part of the statute, one should ask
first what the purpose of the "fair consideration" requirement is. If
it is regarded as merely a per se rule that implements the general
idea of a fraudulent conveyance, the next inquiry should be
whether the transaction was one in which it was likely or even pos-
sible that the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors. If it is not, one should conclude either that the per se
rule is unavoidably overbroad or that the extension of the rule is
unjustified.
This view of section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, however, is incomplete. The drafters of that act intended to
reach some transactions-such as gifts by insolvent debtors-quite
apart from whether the debtor could be thought to have harbored
any fraudulent intent.12 They thought that an insolvent debtor
who gives 1000 dollars to his mother makes a fraudulent convey-
ance, even if he has made a similar gift each year in the past and is
11. We cannot assume that a debtor is trying to shortchange creditors if he merely
pays off one creditor without attendant circumstances such as a side deal that allows him to
keep possession of the property he purports to transfer.
12. A person who wishes to be generous to a relative or friend does not necessarily
have a bad state of mind toward creditors. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor
to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505, 509-11, 544 (1977) (referring to a "moral" obligation
not to make gifts while insolvent).
1985]
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not motivated in the slightest by a desire to thwart creditors. The
drafters deemed these fraudulent not because the transfers were
too costly to distinguish from gifts by insolvents made with an in-
tent to defraud, 13 but rather because they found them inherently
objectionable. A birthday gift of cash by an insolvent debtor in-
jures creditors just as much when his intentions are innocent as
when they are not, and one can presume creditors would ban them
if they could.
If fraudulent conveyance law is not limited simply to cases in
which the debtor intended-or could be presumed to have in-
tended-to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, what are its lim-
its? Much of the case law under the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act and federal bankruptcy law has concerned individual
rather than corporate debtors and most of the transfers attacked
as fraudulent conveyances have been between relatives, friends, or
other insiders. If a case did not concern a transfer in which the
possibility of a deliberate effort to hinder, delay, or defraud was
high, typically it concerned a gratuitous transfer that never could
have redounded to the benefit of the creditors and that the credi-
tors would have prohibited given the opportunity. Most of the
transactions that creditors sought to set aside were close either to
the sham transfers that were at the heart of the Statute of 13 Eliz-
abeth or to the gifts to relatives or friends that were addressed by
the drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. For this
reason, the reach of fraudulent conveyance law has not been an
issue for much of this century.
The issue has become an important one in the 1980's, how-
ever. 14 Identifying the precise reach of fraudulent conveyance law
13. This point is made in Comment, Guarantees and Section 548 (a)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1985).
14. See, e.g., In re New Yorketown Assoc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)
(construing 11 U.S.C. § 548, holding that it "was enacted to correct the improper depleting
of the debtor's assets .... This diminution may occur whether the debtor participates or
not."). The basic question, however, was framed long ago. See Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns.
Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (Kent, C.) (any voluntary conveyance for inadequate consideration
by an indebted person is fraudulent); McCoid, supra note 10, at 649-56 (tracing the devel-
opment from the opinion by Chancellor Kent in Boyd & Suydam v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch.
478 (N.Y. Ch. 1815)). The Reade holding was rejected by the Supreme Court in Warren v.
Moody, 122 U.S. 132 (1887), and is criticized in McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 407-09 (1933).
The issue was addressed by Congress last year. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 421(i), (j)(1), 463(a)(1), 98 Stat. 333, has
amended the definition of "transfer" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982) (renumbered as §
101(48)). These amendments appear to overrule the majority and concurring opinions in In
re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984) (holding that grant-
[Vol. 38:829
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is the crucial inquiry in several important legal disputes, such as
whether a foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption 15 or a
leveraged buyout e is a fraudulent conveyance. These cases are
strikingly different from gratuitous transfers or transfers intended
to defraud. It is not clear that permitting the debtor to engage in a
leveraged buyout, for instance, is against the long-term interests of
the creditors as a group. Because fraudulent conveyance law's use
of "fair consideration" is not limited solely to cases in which fraud-
ulent intent can be presumed, a view has recently gained currency
that suggests the core principle of fraudulent conveyance law is
that creditors should be able to set aside transfers by insolvent
debtors that harm the creditors as a group. Under such view, this
principle, which covers both transfers made with fraudulent intent
and gifts, should inform construction of a section such as section 4
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.17 But, just as a view of
section 4 that treats it as a surrogate of section 7's intentional
fraud standard is too narrow, we believe this competing principle is
too broad.
To establish this, we start from a simple, but important,
proposition. After a debtor has borrowed money, his interests con-
flict with those of his creditors. A debtor has an incentive to take
ing and recording of second deed of trust which occurred more than one year before suit
constituted the only transfer and therefore the foreclosure sale itself could not be a fraudu-
lent conveyance). Several months later, however, Senators Dole and DeConcini added to the
Congressional Record a discussion between them in which they noted that the new language
was originally part of a set of amendments that would affirm Madrid. They asserted that
Congress intended to drop all amendments affecting Madrid and that "parties. . . who seek
avoidance of prepetition foreclosure sales would find no support for their arguments in these
amendments." See 130 CoNG. REC. S13,771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
15. Compare In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank
& Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Durrett v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980); In re New Yorketown Assoc., 40
Bankr. 701 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) with In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984); In re
Strauser, 40 Bankr. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). See generally Alden, Gross &
Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving
the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1624 (1983) (concluding that a mortgagor may institute a
bankruptcy suit to invalidate the secured lender's foreclosure sale of the mortgaged prop-
erty); Coppel & Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of "Transfer", 100 BANK-
ING L.J. 676 (1983) (disapproving of cases attacking foreclosure sales as fraudulent convey-
ances); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and
Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAw. 977 (1984) (same).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
There is a similar problem with intercorporate guarantees. See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers
Hanover Bank, 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
17. Many of the cases construe 11 U.S.C. § 548 instead of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. Subject to some exceptions, the issues tend to be the same.
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risks that he did not have before he borrowed. He enjoys all the
benefits if a risky venture proves successful, but he does not incur
all the costs if the venture fails.18 Every transfer he makes that has
the effect of making an asset less like cash benefits the debtor at
his creditors' expense. Creditors rely upon existing legal rules and
contractual terms to limit unwarranted risk-taking by their debtor.
Creditors, however, do not want to place too many restraints on
their debtor. Creditors lend money in the first instance because the
debtor has entrepreneurial skills that they do not have. To take
advantage of the debtor's skills, creditors must give their debtor a
certain amount of freedom. To give the debtor the power to make
correct decisions, creditors must to some extent give him the power
to make wrong decisions. Allowing creditors to escape the conse-
quences of their debtor's bad decisions after the fact has costs as
well as benefits. To decide whether the benefits justify the rule,
one must also be sensitive to the costs that rule brings.
A creditor would not want to impose all possible restraints
upon a debtor, even if the absence of a restraint exposes the credi-
tor to the risk that the debtor will injure it. Fraudulent conveyance
law is a restraint that the law imposes upon debtors for the benefit
of creditors by giving creditors the power to void transactions. The
power of creditors to set aside transactions after the fact limits the
ability of debtors to engage in the transactions in the first instance.
This power is unobjectionable if the transaction-such as a gift by
an insolvent debtor-always injures creditors. But often the trans-
action-such as a leveraged buyout-might or might not injure
creditors. If one applies fraudulent conveyance law to leveraged
buyouts, one might protect some creditors who were injured after
the fact, but one might work counter to the interests of those cred-
itors who, before the fact, would have wanted their debtor to have
the power to enter into such transactions.
Treating transfers by a debtor that make creditors as a group
worse off as fraudulent conveyances is overbroad because many or-
dinary transfers that a debtor makes do this. Like any other credi-
tor remedy, fraudulent conveyance law must have some limits. In-
deed, in considering a legal rule such as fraudulent conveyance law,
overbroad rules may be more pernicious than underbroad rules. It
is easier for creditors to contract into prohibitions on conduct by a
18. See generally Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 97 (1984) (discussion of different incentives when assets
owned by diverse people with different rights).
[Vol. 38:829
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debtor than it is to contract out. If fraudulent conveyance law does
not cover a certain kind of activity, yet creditors want to prohibit
it, it can be prohibited contractually. Myriad restrictions in loan
agreements, for example, perform this function. If certain activity
is prohibited by a few large creditors, other creditors (including
nonconsensual creditors) may be able to profit by the monitoring
of the debtor undertaken, by those whose contracts do prohibit
such activity. Yet, contracting out of a rule that prohibits conduct,
such as fraudulent conveyance law, is much harder. To be effective,
the consent of all creditors must be reached. And in the unlikely
case that all creditors did so agree, the trustee in bankruptcy could
still seek to upset the transfer under section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code."'
Thus, we believe, one must be careful in deciding where to
place the reach of fraudulent conveyance law. In establishing its
limits, one must recognize that the debtor-creditor relationship is
essentially contractual.2" A creditor acquires certain rights to con-
trol its debtor's actions. The more rights the creditor acquires, the
lower its risk and the lower the interest rate it enjoys. Not all the
rights that the creditor wants, or that the debtor would agree to
give it, however, can be bargained for explicitly. Sometimes these
rights (such as priority rights with respect to a debtor's assets) af-
fect third parties as well and should be subject to legal constraints.
The ambition of the law governing the debtor-creditor relation-
ship, including fraudulent conveyance law, should provide all the
19. 11 U.S.C. § 548; see Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir.
1959) (making that point). The normative desirability of such a result is questioned in Jack-
son, supra note 10, at 779.
20. Many claimants are, of course, nonconsensual, but we think that fact is unimpor-
tant in discussing the bases of fraudulent conveyance law. In the first place, we think that
debtor-creditor law should presumptively give all creditors the set of rights they would bar-
gain for if they could, and if they had the time and sophistication to do it. "Nonconsensual"
creditors, be they tort or tax, would not necessarily want different limits of restraint than
would consensual creditors. Indeed, in many respects, their interests in controlling the
debtor are identical. As a result, the limits that consensual creditors would impose on in-
vestments by a debtor also largely will protect nonconsensual claimants because of the con-
gruence in their interests. To be sure, their interests are not always congruent. For example,
certain actions by a debtor (such as safety measures) may affect only tort claimants directly.
In those cases, other legal rules might be desirable to place monitoring burdens on the con-
sensual creditors. See, e.g., Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: As-
bestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STA. L. REv. 1045 (1984). These controls, however,
are not likely to be imposed via fraudulent conveyance law. Finally, to focus on the protec-
tions nonconsensual creditors would want is a species of a larger inquiry, which implicates,




parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if
they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of
their deal. Fraudulent conveyance law, in other words, should be
viewed as a species of contract law, representing one kind of con-
trol that creditors generally would want to impose and that debt-
ors generally would agree to accept.21
II. DEBTOR MISBEHAVIOR AND THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN
Hundreds of different mechanisms have evolved-from net
worth and accounting requirements to security interests and de-
fault clauses-that also guard against the risk of unacceptable
debtor behavior.2" These contract provisions have evolved in the
context of a tension between debtor freedom and creditor protec-
tion. Complete deference to creditor protection in fashioning legal
rules makes no more sense than complete deference to debtor free-
dom. Any device that protects creditors inevitably brings costs as
well as benefits. We typically presume that a firm's investment de-
cisions should be made by its managers even though that freedom
necessarily conflicts to some extent with creditor security. This
conflict motivates creditors to bargain for limitations on the ability
of a debtor to engage in certain activities.23 The function of legal
rules in this area should be either to constrain deals between debt-
ors and creditors that affect third parties or to provide preformu-
lated provisions that the parties usually would contract for
anyway.
21. Fraudulent conveyance law thus becomes a species of a "preformulated" or "off
the rack" rule. See Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 997, 1003-04 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YAL.E
L.J. 698, 700-03 (1982); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Com-
pensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 n.87 (1977). Professor Clark notes that this rationale
explains the prohibition on gratuitous transfers by insolvent debtors. See Clark, supra note
12, at 544 ("[E]very contract creditor has a fundamental right to expect that such transfers
will not be made, and treating this right as a ground rule that need not be expressed un-
doubtedly cuts down bargaining costs.").
22. See generally Clark, supra note 12 (discussing fraudulent conveyance law, equita-
ble subordination doctrine, dividend restraint statutes, piercing the corporate veil, and the
interrelations between the doctrines).
23. In practice, creditors can and do bargain for many conditions, the violation any
one of which will accelerate all of the debtor's obligations. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SEcuRIrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 798-99
(1984); Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under International Bank Loan Agreements with
Foreign Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 89,
90-100; Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J.
FIN. ECON. 117, 151 (1979).
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It is in this context, we believe, that one must approach fraud-
ulent conveyance law. It should not be construed to reach all trans-
fers that benefit a debtor at the creditors' expense because such a
principle is unlimitable and conflicts with the general notion that
the debtor should make investment decisions. Any time that a
creditor lends his debtor 100 dollars and the debtor converts the
cash into an asset the value of which is less certain, then the credi-
tor is worse off, in the same way it would be worse off if the debtor
used the 100 dollars to buy a lottery ticket that has a one-in-ten
chance of paying 1000 dollars. The value of the lottery ticket is 100
dollars. But the creditors are not indifferent between a debtor with
100 dollars cash and a lottery ticket worth 100 dollars. Creditors
never will recover more than 100 dollars, even if the lottery ticket
is a winning one, and they will recover nothing in the nine cases
out of ten in which the lottery ticket is a losing one. Converting the
funds into a drill press or raw materials or using them to pay
wages is different only in degree. It may be very likely that the
investment will produce more than 100 dollars in the end, but
there is a chance it will not. If the investment does return more
than 100 dollars, the debtor enjoys the benefit; if it returns less,
the creditors bear most of the loss. Thus, one should not construe a
prohibition on transfers for less than "fair consideration" by ask-
ing simply whether the investment leaves the creditors with as
much as they had before. At a minimum, the concept of "fair con-
sideration" needs to be analyzed from the perspective of the
debtor and creditors taken as a unit.
What, then, of an argument about investments that simply are
bad? Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and
similar statutes do not reach all transactions by an insolvent
debtor that reduce the recovery of creditors, but only those that
are made for less than "fair consideration" or "reasonably
equivalent value." Therefore, one might choose to justify these
statutes not on the overly broad ground that creditors should be
able to set aside all transfers that make them worse off, but rather
on the narrower ground that creditors should be able to set aside
transfers that are bad even if there were no conflicts between the
debtor and his creditors. A risk-neutral person who has no credi-
tors would be indifferent between receiving 100 dollars and a lot-
tery ticket that offers a one-in-ten chance of winning 1000 dollars.
But this person would not be indifferent if the lottery ticket offers
a one-in-ten chance of winning 500 dollars. One can argue that a
creditor should be able to set aside its insolvent debtor's deal only
1985]
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if it is bad from a neutral perspective. An insolvent debtor might
choose to go beyond merely taking risks-he might take unwise
ones.
Using the fraudulent conveyance remedy to undo bad deals,
however, can be justified only if its benefits are greater than the
costs of the uncertainty such a rule brings. Often one cannot deter-
mine with any certainty whether a debtor was insolvent at a par-
ticular time or whether a particular transaction at that time was a
good deal or a bad deal.24 Even if a definite determination could be
made, creditors still might not bargain for the right to set such
transfers aside after the fact because of the effects such a right
would have on third parties and, ultimately, on the debtor's invest-
ment decisions. A creditor who lends a debtor money is taking ad-
vantage of the debtor's comparative advantage in using that money
productively. A creditor necessarily defers to the debtor's skill in
converting the money into other assets. The risk that both the
creditor and debtor take is that the use the debtor makes of the
money will benefit both parties. The creditor provides the capital,
the debtor provides the know-how. The creditor is relying on the
debtor's skill and judgment when it makes the loan. Only by giving
the debtor discretion can the creditor hope to profit. Giving a
debtor discretion, however, necessarily gives him the ability not
only to make good decisions, but bad ones as well.
Of course, creditors do place limits on a debtor's ability to
make bad decisions. A creditor might insist, for example, that the
debtor use the funds only to open a shoe store. The debtor would
not have the freedom to use the money to open a store that sold
nothing but popcorn. The creditor may bargain for the right to call
the loan if the debtor violates such a restriction. Indeed, a creditor
may bargain for the right to call the loan at any time it pleases. It
is unlikely, however, that a debtor's creditors ever would agree that
the creditors could veto all the debtor's decisions after the fact. If
the debtor were insolvent, the creditors collectively could file a
bankruptcy petition and assert control over the assets themselves.
But they would not insist on being able to set aside transactions
that their debtor entered into in good faith and at arm's length,
unless the cost of distinguishing such transactions from one in
24. For purposes of fraudulent conveyance law, "insolvency" typically is defined as the
status existing when "the present fair salable value of [a person's] assets is less than the
amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they be-




which the debtor did not act in good faith was thought to be too
great. If such control were given to creditors, too many third par-
ties would be deterred from doing business with the debtor. These
third parties would know that if the deal turned out to be a bad
one for them and a good one for the debtor, they would bear the
loss. They also would know that if the deal turned out to be a good
one for them and a bad one for the debtor, the creditors might be
able to set aside the transfer. Third parties would have nothing to
gain and something to lose by dealing with an insolvent (or possi-
bly insolvent) debtor whose creditors could second-guess his deci-
sions. Third parties would pay less to debtors bound under such
terms.25 Their reluctance to deal with the debtor would make the
debtor (and indirectly, the creditors) worse off.
Creditors can expect their debtor to enter into favorable deals
with others only if they expose themselves to the risk that the
debtor will enter into unfavorable deals. That is part and parcel of
the reason for making the investment in the first place-to use the
debtor's comparative advantage in entrepreneurial or investment
skills. A fraudulent conveyance law that protects creditors from all
bad deals a debtor enters into gives the creditors too much. Such
creditor protection is unlikely to be a right that all interested par-
ties would agree to if they were able to bargain explicitly.26 The
effect of such protection is to reduce risky investments. But risk-
taking may be in the best interests of all the parties concerned.
Therefore, a preformulated rule should not protect creditors from
bad investments.
To be sure, it may be difficult for creditors to monitor the
debtor closely enough to know when his financial condition is suffi-
ciently perilous that they should step in before the debtor, through
action or inaction, compromises their interests. But even if credi-
tors were not able to prevent the debtor from engaging in improvi-
dent actions, they probably would bargain for rights other than a
general right to undo bad deals. Creditors, for example, might pre-
fer to have the power to upset any transaction (or transaction for
25. See In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark,
J., dissenting); McCoid, supra note 10, at 658-63. A similar argument has been made by
Professor Brudney in a different context. Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Pro-
posed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 331-35 (1974).
26. Professor Clark makes a similar point about deeming small initial capitalization as
a legal "wrong." He is uncertain that contract creditors would want a clause prescribing
such a result, and he believes that with respect to tort claimants, better alternatives may
exist. Clark, supra note 12, at 544.
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less than fair consideration) made while the debtor was insolvent if
the transferee did not give them advance notice of the transaction
so that creditors could act. Creditors would have the burden of
drafting default clauses and other provisions that would enable
them to limit the debtor's freedom to act, but the transferee would
have the burden of informing the creditors that something was in
the works. This is the basic rationale behind bulk sales laws.
Such a regime stands a much better chance of allocating bur-
dens between creditors and transferees in a cost-effective way than
a general standard that did little to channel the conduct of the
parties before the fact. A broad fraudulent conveyance rule does
not provide an incentive for creditors to do the monitoring they
are capable of doing.28 If creditors always can undo transactions
afterwards, they have every incentive to wait and upset only those
transactions that turn out unfavorably from their perspective.
Bulk sales laws, to be sure, are hardly the success stories of
American commercial law. One sensibly could argue that they are
out of step with the way business is conducted today, that the bur-
dens they impose are too onerous, and that the good they do is too
intangible.2 9 But bulk sales laws are more discrete and less intru-
sive than fraudulent conveyance laws. Extending fraudulent con-
veyance law beyond preventing sham transactions and gratuitous
transfers by insolvents is a step that should be taken only with
caution.
These problems are all in addition to the enormous practical
problem of determining whether a debtor is insolvent at any given
time. Consider the following situation. Debtor is a small high-tech
company that is developing two different computers. The success
of each computer turns in large measure on whether another man-
ufacturer can make the electronic chip each computer will need. In
January 1983, Debtor needs additional cash. At that time it has 2
million dollars in debt. Debtor decides to take one of the com-
puters it is developing and sell it (and the software and research
and development associated with it) to Buyer for 1 million dollars
and to concentrate on bringing the other computer to market. Two
years later, Debtor files a bankruptcy petition. The retained com-
27. See U.C.C. art. 6 (1978).
28. The problem of finding appropriate monitors, and providing them with incentives
to monitor, is discussed in a somewhat different context in Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
29. For a discussion of the problems of bulk sales laws, see A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 503-06 (1982).
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puter turned out to be worthless because the required chip could
not be made. The computer that Buyer bought from Debtor, on
the other hand, was a dramatic success. Buyer resold the rights to
the computer to another manufacturer for 500,000 dollars more
than its investment in the machine. Buyer's success with the com-
puter was due almost entirely to the use of a new chip. At the time
the computer was being designed (and at the time of the sale to
Buyer), no one knew whether this chip (or the one for the com-
puter that was kept) could be manufactured successfully.
Now assume Debtor's creditors (through the trustee in bank-
ruptcy) argue that the sale of the machine to Buyer was a fraudu-
lent conveyance and that Buyer thus should be allowed to keep
only what is actually paid for the machine (1 million dollars) and
remit 500,000 dollars to Debtor. The trustee will argue that Debtor
was insolvent at the time of the sale because it had only two assets
(the two computers), one worthless and the other worth 1.5 million
dollars. The fair value of Debtor's assets, therefore, was less than
its 2 million dollars in liabilities. The trustee then will argue that
the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance because Debtor traded
away something worth 1.5 million dollars for 1 million dollars.
Meeting either of these arguments will be difficult. Debtor was
solvent at the time of the sale only if the computer it kept had a
positive value. But at the time of the bankruptcy petition, the re-
tained computer clearly had no value. It would have value only if
the chip it was to use could be manufactured successfully, and ev-
eryone at the time of the petition knew that it could not be.
Nevertheless, valuations necessarily involve uncertainty. How
much a piece of property is worth depends both on when the valu-
ation is made and on how much is known by the person making
the valuation. The two computers in this example are like lottery
tickets in a situation in which the drawing intervenes between the
sale and the bankruptcy petition. A determination of whether
Debtor was solvent in January 1983 should turn on how much the
assets were worth then, which, in turn, depends on how much was
known then. Just as the value of a lottery ticket before the drawing
turns on the likelihood of winning, not on whether it eventually
proved to be the winning number, the value of the computer
Debtor retained should reflect the likelihood in January 1983 that
the chip could successfully be manufactured, not the fact that it
later turned out that it could not be. But this does not end the
inquiry. The chances that the chip would be unavailable might
have been better known to some than to others. Therefore, one
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must decide whose knowledge is relevant.
Similarly, in deciding whether Buyer acquired the computer
for less than fair consideration, one must value the computer at
the time of sale based on then-present knowledge. The computer
turned out to be worth 1.5 million dollars, but if it was equally
likely that it would be worth only 500,000 dollars, then 1 million
dollars well might have been a fair price for it. Debtor may have
acted as any reasonable businessman would. He sold the computer
because having 1 million dollars in cash seemed to be better than
keeping the computer. Buyer, however, presumably bought the
computer believing it would be better to have the computer than
the 1 million dollars. The creditors presumably invested in Debtor
because they wanted Debtor to make some judgment calls on
which assets to keep and which assets to sell.
Monday morning quarterbacking is easy. It will be easy to ar-
gue that an astute businessman would have to know in January
1983 that the 1.5 million dollar computer was worth 1.5 million
dollars and the worthless computer was worthless. It will be more
difficult to argue that the worthless computer, which, in retrospect,
never had any chance of success, was valuable as of January 1983
and that the ultimately successful computer was not so valuable as
of that time. It is also too easy to fall into the trap of thinking that
Buyer is not made worse off if he is deprived only of his profits
from the transaction." Debtor's creditors would never exercise
their right to overturn the sale and reacquire the computer for its
original price if the value turned out to be less than what Buyer
paid. If Buyer cannot keep the gains if the deal turns out favora-
bly, he will not be compensated for the risk that the deal will turn
out unfavorably. Even if judges do not have the bias that usually
accompanies valuations after the fact, the process of valuing assets
is an uncertain one. This uncertainty imposes costs on the parties,
which somehow must be offset by the gains from reexamining
closed deals.
As we have seen, however, that principle itself is suspect. The
fallacy of imposing a general duty on those who transact with a
30. See, e.g., UNn'. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 8 (Proposed Official Draft 1984). This
fallacy occasionally reasserts itself in bankruptcy law. See, e.g., § 7-303(3) of the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973, contained in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1973, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Part II, at 241
(1973) (proposal for a "second look"); Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1982) (accepts valuation below present probability of success on ground that otherwise cred-
itor might have too much voice).
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debtor who is later determined to have been insolvent to pay fair
consideration or be at risk for the difference stems from the notion
that a rule permitting creditors to overturn bad deals is needed
when the debtor is insolvent to prevent him from acting against
the interests of the creditors. But this proves too much. A debtor's
incentives almost never parallel his creditors' interests. Incentives
change when a creditor enters the picture because then more than
one person claims rights in assets.31 An individual who owns all his
assets outright bears all the losses and enjoys all the benefits from
any transaction he enters. If he borrows money or otherwise ob-
tains credit, his incentives become skewed. He enjoys all the
residual benefits but, given the limited liability of corporations and
the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy, he does not bear all
the losses. If the transaction by which the computer was sold was
not actively hidden from the creditors and did not bear other sus-
picious attributes such as retention of possession, then the transfer
should not be voidable. The remedy is needlessly crude and does
not work to the creditors' long-term interest.
III. FORECLOSURE SALES
All debtors have an incentive to take risks that are not in the
interest of either the creditors or the creditors and debtor collec-
tively. There are any number of devices that respond to this basic
agency-cost problem, such as security interests.3 2 Fraudulent con-
veyance law can be understood as a response to the incentives for
advantage-taking that exist whenever a debtor-creditor relation-
ship arises. It is only a partial response, however, and in determin-
ing its proper scope, one must decide how this type of rule can
reduce the agency-cost problem in a way that is cost-effective and
in the interests of all the creditors. The application of fraudulent
conveyance doctrine to foreclosure sales and leveraged buyouts il-
lustrates the difficulties in this inquiry.
The inconsistency between an expansive ban on transfers of
property of insolvent debtors for less than fair consideration,
whether voluntary or involuntary, and the rules governing credi-
tors' remedies is apparent from the recent controversy over
whether to treat some foreclosure sales as fraudulent convey-
31. Baird & Jackson, supra note 18, at 104-09.
32. See generally Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among




ances.33 Assume Bank lends 100,000 dollars to Debtor and takes a
security interest in an undeveloped piece of real estate that Debtor
recently bought for 150,000 dollars. Several years later, Debtor's
business collapses, and he becomes insolvent and defaults on his
obligation to Bank. Bank exercises its default rights and eventually
there is a foreclosure sale, at which the property is sold to a third
party for 100,001 dollars. Six months later, Debtor files a bank-
ruptcy petition. Debtor's trustee moves to set aside the foreclosure
sale as a fraudulent conveyance. The argument he makes is as fol-
lows: Debtor was insolvent at the time of the sale, the sale was a
transfer (albeit an involuntary one) either, simply, of Debtor's
property or, somewhat more subtly, of Debtor's equity of redemp-
tion (his right to get the property back if he repaid Bank the
100,001 dollars), and the sale was for less than fair consideration or
reasonably equivalent value. The last part of the argument turns
on whether the property was in fact worth more than 100,001 dol-
lars at the time of the foreclosure sale, but a foreclosure sale often
brings less than what the debtor thinks it should. Finding an ex-
pert who will agree with the trustee on this point, thereby prevent-
ing summary judgment for Bank, should not prove difficult.
If one adopts the view that the prohibition on transfers for
less than fair consideration-commonly termed section 4 fraudu-
lent conveyances because of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act-merely implements, in rule fashion, the principle embodied
in the prohibition on transfers intended to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors, then the problem of whether to treat foreclosure of
a debtor's equity of redemption as a fraudulent conveyance is quite
straightforward. Such foreclosure cannot be a fraudulent convey-
ance. Bank has given the world notice of its interest and merely is
exercising rights that every other creditor knows Bank already has.
Because Debtor was insolvent, Debtor may not have paid as much
attention to the sale of the property as he would have if the
chances were greater that he, rather than his creditors, would enjoy
the difference between the price paid for the property and the
amount of Bank's lien. Nonetheless, this is evidence of only
debtor-passivity, not collusion between Debtor and Bank,34 and
debtor-passivity does not seem to be the stuff from which one can
presume an intent on the part of Debtor to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud his creditors.
33. See sources cited supra note 15.
34. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 780-83.
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But section 4 does more than function as a per se rule derived
from section 7. Therefore, deciding whether a foreclosure sale can
be a fraudulent conveyance when there has been only debtor-pas-
sivity requires identifying the principles underlying fraudulent
conveyance law. It might be argued, as it increasingly has been,
that debtor-passivity alone should be enough to trigger the provi-
sion. This approach would interpret the notion of a "transfer by
the debtor" broadly and include within it transfers that involved
no active participation by the debtor.35 Before the foreclosure sale,
Debtor had an asset that was worth 50,000 dollars to him. (He
could pay Bank 100,000 dollars and obtain rights to a piece of
property worth 150,000 dollars.) After the sale, the asset vanished
and Debtor gained nothing in return. The injury to the creditors is
the same regardless whether Debtor actively colluded with Bank or
whether he simply did nothing while the foreclosure sale was tak-
ing place. Under this view, the foreclosure sale should be set aside
because the extinguishing of the debtor's right of redemption (and
the vesting of all rights in the real estate in the purchaser) is a
"transfer" of property that disadvantages the creditors as a group.
This transaction is different from a repayment of one of Debtor's
obligations to which the other creditors could not object because a
simple preference does not diminish the assets available to the
creditors as a group. The difference is that in this case the prop-
erty Debtor is losing is more valuable than the debt that is being
repaid. Hence the total amount received by the creditors as a
group diminishes.
Yet this approach suffers from several problems. As we have
shown, a rule that looks simply to whether the creditors are as well
off after a transfer as before is, as a principle, overbroad and must
be articulated in some narrower fashion. Moreover, this transaction
historically was not considered a fraudulent conveyance in the ab-
sence of collusion between Bank and Debtor.36 Section 4 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the analogous provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code are subject to the interpretation that fore-
35. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, §§ 421(i), (j)(1), 463(a)(1), 98 Stat. 333, amended 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (now § 101(48)) to
pick up involuntary transfers. Proposed UNw. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 1(12) (Proposed
Official Draft 1984) also expressly covers involuntary transfers. This is criticized in Jackson,
supra note 10, at 780-83.
36. See Michel v. J's Foods, Inc., 99 N.M. 574, 661 P.2d 474 (1983); 1 G. GLENN, supra
note 2, § 214a, at 366-68 (discussion of "collusive" foreclosure); cf. Ozias v. Renner, 78 Ohio




closure of a debtor's equity of redemption might be a fraudulent
conveyance, but one easily can argue that that would be an incor-
rect interpretation. Neither statute's language compels the inter-
pretation. In the case of section 4, one can argue that there is not a
"transfer" because the extinguishment of Debtor's contingent
property interest is not a "transfer" of that interest 7 any more
than the failure to exercise an option or the termination of a lease
is a transfer of property from one person to another. 8 Under both
section 4 and section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, one can argue
that the price realized at a properly conducted foreclosure sale is
always for "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent value. '3 9
Choosing between the two possible interpretations (as well as
deciding how to amend either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act or the Bankruptcy Code) should begin with an inquiry into
why a foreclosure sale ever should be subject to judicial scrutiny
after the fact. The problem is a well-known one. The price realized
at a foreclosure sale often is well below the price that might have
been obtained if someone had invested energy in courting buyers
and dickering with them. But protecting the rights of the debtor in
a foreclosure sale through fraudulent conveyance law may be
counterproductive. One effect of a rule that subjects all foreclosure
sales to the possibility of being set aside at some later time may be
to depress the price realized at these sales still further. Potential
buyers at foreclosure sales will be afraid that a low-priced sale will
cause a court to find a fraudulent conveyance. Anyone who buys at
foreclosure sales in a world in which such sales are fraudulent con-
veyances when a court after the fact finds the price too low will
pay even less for the property. He can no longer be sure that he
will be able to enjoy any appreciation in its value.40
Rules governing the sale of collateral are a compromise be-
tween facilitating secured credit and protecting the interests of the
37. See In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1984). Because of a 1984
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, it may be difficult to argue this under 11 U.S.C. § 548.
See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
421(i), 98 Stat. 333. But see supra note 14 (discussion of legislative history of 1984
amendments).
38. See UNi. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(0(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1984). But
see In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla- 1976) (holding that a lease cancellation might
be a fraudulent conveyance).
39. See In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); In re Strauser, 40 Bankr. 868
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). This is the approach of the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT
(Proposed Official Draft 1984). See id. § 3(b) & comment 4.
40. See sources cited supra note 25.
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debtor and those who have claims against him. Part 5 of Article 9,
which establishes the procedure that secured creditors must follow,
is a good example of one type of compromise. The gist of Article 9
seems to be that a secured creditor who repossesses collateral and
jumps through the proper procedural hoops need not worry about
second-guessing over whether the price realized was sufficient.
41
The assumption is that an adequate price follows from adequate
procedures-including public sale requirements-often enough so
that more is to be lost than gained from litigating the adequacy of
the price after the fact. This is especially true given the uncer-
tainty that such litigation might cast over the entire transaction
and the resultant effect that uncertainty itself will have on the
sales price.
One can argue whether the conclusion in Article 9 is correct.
These rules may provide too little protection to a debtor and his
other creditors. But particularly given the rules themselves, it
seems unlikely that fraudulent conveyance statutes ever were in-
tended to be a part of this balance between a secured creditor on
the one hand and the debtor and his other creditors on the other.42
Hence, it seems unwise to conscript those laws for this purpose
now. They are not part of the off-the-rack terms that govern the
problem. Most fraudulent conveyance statutes were passed long
before rules governing the sale of collateral were created, and the
statutes never applied to noncollusive foreclosure sales until de-
cades after the sale-of-collateral rules were adopted. There is no
evidence in the interim that creditors thought this kind of problem
warranted the fraudulent conveyance remedy. There is no evidence
of a need for such a preformulated rule. Introducing a broad prohi-
bition on transfers for less than fair consideration in this case ex-
tends a general standard into an area in which a specific rule al-
ready has been promulgated without any evidence that creditors
think such a prohibition is worth its costs. A careful balance al-
ready has been struck that is designed to address exactly the same
problems it is now argued should be attacked through fraudulent
conveyance laws.
To be sure, the costs that foreclosure sales impose on creditors
of an insolvent (and often passive) debtor might be substantial.
41. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978). A number of courts, however, are unable to accept this prin-
ciple and use § 9-507 to reexamine the fairness of the price. This trend is criticized in
Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J. L. & EcON.
117 (1983).
42. See 1 G. GLENN, supra note 2, § 214a; Jackson, supra note 10, at 777-86.
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These costs are of two sorts. First, a foreclosure sale, like any other
action that repays a particular creditor, results in fewer assets be-
ing available for others. Assume Debtor has 100 dollars in assets
and owes two creditors 100 dollars each. If Debtor repays Creditor
A 100 dollars or if Creditor A repossesses the assets or reduces its
claim to judgment and has the sheriff levy on the assets, Creditor
B is made worse off (although the creditors as a group are not).
Preferring one creditor over another, without more, however, is not
a fraudulent conveyance.4
Such a transfer does "delay" and "hinder" those creditors who
remain unpaid. The debtor has received nothing for having made
the transfer, and the remaining creditors are less likely to be paid
in full. But a simple preference of one creditor over another cannot
be a transaction that one creditor can set aside. As long as no col-
lective proceeding has been commenced, each creditor must look
after his own interests. If Debtor owes 100 dollars to Creditor A
and 100 dollars to Creditor B and has a piece of property worth
100 dollars, the creditor who will be paid is the one that acts the
swiftest. If Creditor A recovers 100 dollars, it makes no sense to
treat the transaction as a fraudulent conveyance and to allow
Creditor B to levy on the asset. As long as no legal rule forces cred-
itors to cooperate, there is no reason to protect Creditor A or B.
Outside a compulsory, collective proceeding, treating simple pref-
erences as fraudulent conveyances would not prevent one creditor
from being paid at the expense of the other. It merely would prefer
the creditor who was second in time rather than the one who was
first.44 A simple preference makes some creditors worse off, but it
does not make the debtor better off nor does it necessarily disad-
vantage the creditors as a group. Preferences do undermine collec-
tive proceedings, and, accordingly, it is clear why preferences gen-
erally are prohibited only in bankruptcy or other collective
proceedings.
43. See 1 G. GLENN, supra note 2, at 1 ("[T]he preference materially differs from the
fraudulent conveyance, because it sins, not against the single creditor's right of realization,
but only against the collective right, of the creditors as a class, that arises when their debtor
becomes insolvent."). Compare Jackson Sound Studios, Inc. v. Travis, 473 F.2d 503 (5th Cir.
1973) (late filing of security interest by mother of debtor's president constituted a fraudu-
lent conveyance) with Epstein v. Goldstein, 107 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1939) (preferential trans-
fer to wife not a fraudulent conveyance, even if husband intended to defraud other credi-
tors). But cf. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 5(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1984)
(deeming preferences to insiders when the debtor is insolvent to be fraudulent conveyances).
44. See Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 402, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (1963); Shelley v. Boothe,
73 Mo. 74 (1880).
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Individual creditor remedies, however, make other creditors
worse off for another reason besides the fact that money which
might have gone to them is transferred to someone else. This sec-
ond and frequently neglected cost is the expense and wastefulness
of the individual creditor remedies themselves. Assume in the
above example that Debtor's assets are worth 150 dollars. Regard-
less of whether Creditor A reduces its claim to judgment or exer-
cises its Article 9 self-help remedies, Debtor and Creditor B are
made worse off because Creditor A's efforts to obtain 100 dollars
will deplete more than 100 dollars of Debtor's assets. Debtor may
spend resources resisting Creditor A's collection efforts. He may be
bound to pay Creditor A's costs of enforcing its claim. Debtor and
Creditor A may spend too few resources trying to obtain the high-
est possible value for the assets.45 Finally, even if Creditor A takes
only 100 dollars worth of assets, the remaining assets may no
longer be worth 50 dollars. This would be the case, for example, if
Creditor A had a security interest in a machine worth 100 dollars
and Debtor had 50 dollars worth of dies that were tailor-made for
that machine. Although Debtor or Creditor A might have been able
to sell the entire package of the machine and the dies for 150 dol-
lars, the dies without the machine might be worth only 10 dollars.
The costs of these individual debt-collection devices are
largely independent of whether Creditor A is secured or unsecured
and of whether Creditor A obtains payment by repossession or by
judicial process. These costs exist whether Debtor actively cooper-
ates or is completely passive. When these costs are large enough, a
bankruptcy proceeding is in order. Indeed, these costs justify the
bulk of bankruptcy laws.46 But the imposition of these costs on a
debtor and his other creditors is part and parcel of a legal regime
in which individual creditors are permitted to and, indeed, must
safeguard their own interests. In this regime, other creditors are
exposed to two types of risks: the risk that others will be preferred
and the risk that the act of preferring another will increase their
costs. The fraudulent conveyance remedy-voiding the transac-
tion-is not the appropriate one for this problem. If either cost
looms too high, the remedy of the creditors is to file a bankruptcy
petition and collectivize the process.
Foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption and the sale of
45. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 781.
46. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 859-71 (1982).
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property at a sheriff's sale following levy and execution impose
identical costs on an insolvent debtor's other creditors. Neither
transaction is a fraudulent conveyance because the preference cost
and the collection cost they impose are necessary when individual
creditors must pursue their own remedies. If the conditions are
ripe for a collective proceeding when the foreclosure sale is to take
place, the debtor should be put into bankruptcy. But if the condi-
tions are not ripe, the transactions that take place under an indi-
vidual debt-collection regime should be respected as long as they
are properly conducted under the specific rules that govern them.
In a world such as this, general creditors have a greater burden of
monitoring their debtor so that they can act (either by pursuing
individual remedies or by joining with other creditors in a bank-
ruptcy petition) than they would if a general standard protected
them and put others at risk of a debtor dissipating his assets. But
monitoring a debtor and his general financial condition is precisely
what general creditors are able to do effectively. Those that cannot
monitor effectively have other alternatives available to them, such
as taking a security interest.
48
IV. THE LEVERAGED BUYOUT
Assume that Firm owes its general creditors 4 million dollars
and has no secured debt. Firm's managers decide to acquire it, and
the old shareholders agree to sell their shares for 1 million dollars.
The managers put up 200,000 dollars of their own money and bor-
row 800,000 dollars from Bank. They agree to give Bank a security
interest in all of Firm's assets to support the loan. The managers
then proceed to use that money to buy the stock in the hands of all
the shareholders. When the transaction is over, the managers own
all the stock, the old shareholders are cashed out, and Firm has 4.8
million dollars in debt. The general creditors take a second priority
position to Bank. As a result, the pool of assets available to satisfy
their loans is 800,000 dollars smaller.
There are any number of ways to structure the transaction so
that the money the managers borrow actually goes to Firm and
never actually is in the hands of the managers. For example, one
47. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 6 (Proposed Official Draft 1984) similarly
would pick up late recordings of mortgages and delayed perfection of security interests as
fraudulent conveyances. We think that this change is unsound. The transfer might be pref-
erential, but it should not be fraudulent. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 783-86.




could divide the transaction into three separate deals: (1) The
managers acquire a few shares of Firm's stock; (2) Firm borrows
800,000 dollars; and (3) Firm reacquires all the stock in the hands
of the nonmanager shareholders. Under this approach, one could
argue that Firm received 800,000 dollars in return for incurring an
800,000 dollar secured obligation. Courts, however, typically have
had no difficulty construing such a segmented transaction as one
deal. Courts will not allow the labels that interested parties place
on their own transactions to control the rights of third parties.
Firm has incurred an obligation (it has promised Bank 800,000 dol-
lars) and made a transfer (it gave Bank a security interest in all its
property) without getting anything in return (the 800,000 dollars
went to the old shareholders).
Even under the narrowest view of fraudulent conveyance law,
the leveraged buyout may be a fraudulent conveyance. 49 The man-
agers and the old shareholders are made better off (by virtue of
having a highly leveraged investment) and the general creditors are
made worse off. The transaction "hinders" the creditors in the
sense that it leaves them with fewer assets than before, and this
may be the intent behind the transaction. In that case, the transac-
tion could be attacked using section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. But before determining whether a leveraged
buyout should be treated as a section 7 fraudulent conveyance,
which requires a messy inquiry into intent, the transaction should
be examined to see whether it falls within any of the other existing
sections. There are two sections containing per se rules that might
lead to the characterization of the leveraged buyout as a fraudu-
lent conveyance. One, embodied in section 4 of the Uniform Fraud-
ulent Conveyance Act, provides that any transfer made by a debtor
while insolvent without receiving fair consideration is a fraudulent
conveyance. In a better world, a leveraged buyout never would run
afoul of this provision. If the old shareholders and managers were
informed fully (which, of course, they are not), the price paid for
the stock would be the difference between the value of all the as-
sets of the firm and all the liabilities. If the assets were worth less
than the liabilities, the managers would not be willing to pay a
positive price for Firm.
In a world in which information is imperfect, however, it may
not be clear whether Firm is solvent. Indeed, even if liabilities ex-
ceed assets at fair valuation, the stock still might trade for a posi-
49. See United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
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tive price because of the possibility that the value of the assets
might prove larger than expected or the liabilities less.50 If the
managers are mistaken and buy out the shareholders of Firm when
it is insolvent, the leveraged buyout seems to fall within section 4.
Another per se rule, embodied in section 5 of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, may reach the leveraged buyout, even
when the transaction does not render Firm insolvent but simply
leaves it with "an unreasonably small capital." Assume that before
the buyout, Firm has assets of 5 million dollars and liabilities of 4
million dollars (as the purchase price of 1 million dollars suggests).
After the transaction, Firm still has assets of 5 million dollars, but
now it has liabilities of 4.8 million dollars. A firm that is this highly
leveraged arguably is too thinly capitalized.
As a matter of sound practice, lawyers must ensure that a firm
acquired in a leveraged buyout is not insolvent or rendered insol-
vent and that managers and others put up enough capital so that
the firm is not too thinly capitalized.51 An important conceptual
question is whether a leveraged buyout in fact presents fraudulent
conveyance problems or comes under a per se rule that turns out
to be overbroad as applied to this particular case. A firm that in-
curs obligations in the course of a buyout does not seem at all like
the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for a
pittance. 2
The question, in other words, is whether a corporate debtor
that incurs additional debt in a leveraged buyout can be presumed
either to be engaging in a manipulation by which it (or its share-
holders) will profit at its creditors' expense or in some other trans-
fer that its creditors would almost always want to ban. At one
level, the answer to this question is straightforward. This transac-
tion does hinder the general creditors of Firm. After the transac-
tion, the general creditors are less likely to be paid. Before the
50. For example, if Firm owed its creditors $100 and its only asset was a lottery ticket
that had a one chance in ten of paying $200 and nine chances in ten of paying nothing, Firm
would be insolvent (it has an asset worth $20 and liabilities of $100), but its total stock still
would trade for $10 because there is a one-in-ten chance that all the creditors will be paid
off and $100 will be left over.
51. Lawyers also face obstacles imposed by other legal principles. For example, various
state corporation codes forbid distributions to shareholders while a firm is insolvent. See,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE: § 501 (West 1977) (prohibiting distributions to shareholders if the
corporation is, or is likely to become, unable to meet its liabilities as they mature). While
such rules do not affect the rights of Bank, they might not allow the old shareholders to
keep the money they receive from the transaction.
52. See Clark, supra note 12, at 544 (comment on thin capitalization).
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transaction, a 1 million dollar cushion protected the general credi-
tors. After the buyout, the general creditors had only a 200,000
dollar cushion. If Firm lost only a few hundred thousand dollars,
the general creditors would discover that they would not be repaid
in full.
Moreover, Firm, or niore precisely, its owners (the old and new
shareholders), benefit to the extent that the general creditors are
disadvantaged. Before the transaction, the shareholders as a group
had invested 1 million dollars to enjoy the profits of a firm with
assets worth 5 million dollars. After the transaction, the sharehold-
ers as a group have 200,000 dollars at risk (instead of 1 million
dollars), yet they still enjoy the profits generated by assets of 5
million dollars.53 Their investment of course is riskier, but a por-
tion of these risks has been passed on to the general creditors. To
the extent that the general creditors are made worse off by facing a
riskier secured loan, the beneficiaries must be the shareholders.
It thus might seem a good thing that these transactions appear
to trigger sections of existing fraudulent conveyance statutes. But
we doubt this is the case. These transactions do not seem to be
clearly to the detriment of creditors, nor did we always see credi-
tors treating such transactions as events of default in their loan
agreements, even before the issue was moved to the domain of
fraudulent conveyance law. With the buyout may come more
streamlined and more effective management. Among other things,
a going-private transaction may save the costs of complying with
relevant federal securities statutes.
A leveraged buyout is analogous to the simple case in which
the firm issues new preferred debt and then uses the proceeds as a
dividend for the existing shareholders. Debt instruments com-
monly control this conduct. If in a particular case those creditors
who were in a position to control this conduct did not, one might
conclude that these creditors should not be able to set this transac-
tion aside. If they had the knowledge and the sophistication to
control such conduct, but did not, there seems to be little reason
for fraudulent conveyance law to control it for them. Indeed, as
long as these creditors were not controlling this kind of debtor mis-
behavior through other kinds of monitoring devices, one might in-
fer that none of the other creditors should be able to set it aside
53. Because of higher debt service, the profits of the firm will be somewhat less, but




either. Although they may not actually have confronted the issue,
their interests and those of other, better positioned creditors ought
to coincide. As long as the creditors who could bargain and prevent
the buyout do not (or do not ensure that they are cashed out when
the buyout takes place), one might infer that the fraudulent con-
veyance remedy did not advance the interests of all the creditors.
If creditors who bargained did limit the ability of the debtor
to incur preferred debt to create dividends for shareholders, one
might argue that the fraudulent conveyance remedy is an appro-
priate off-the-rack term that creditors should presumptively have.
A difficulty with this approach, however, is that the fraudulent
conveyance remedy is very hard to contract out of. Even if it were
in the interests of everyone that the leveraged buyout take place, a
debtor would not be able to ensure that the transaction would be
immune to a fraudulent conveyance attack. In bankruptcy, the
trustee has the power to set aside the entire transaction, even if at
the time of the actual transaction every existing creditor waived its
right to set the transaction aside.5 It may make sense for the trus-
tee to have the power to set aside fraudulent conveyances without
looking to the rights of any actual creditors. The costs of establish-
ing the rights of actual creditors may not be worth the benefits of
having a rule that is more finely tuned. Nevertheless, the inability
of creditors to contract around the fraudulent conveyance remedy
when it is in their interest may suggest that fraudulent conveyance
law should be applied in bankruptcy to a narrow range of cases in
which there is little chance that creditors would find the transfer
in their interest. In those cases in which it is not clear whether
creditors would want to prevent the activity, all the creditors may
be protected if a single one prohibits the transaction. The fraudu-
lent conveyance remedy is far easier to contract into than it is to
contract out of.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is the inability of parties to opt out of fraudu-
lent conveyance law that leads us to think that its reach should be
limited. Fraudulent conveyance law should never apply to arms-
length transactions, even if it appears after the fact that the
debtor's actions injured the creditors. A broader rule than this one
might pick up more cases of fraudulent behavior by debtors and




might allow fewer transactions that creditors would want to pro-
hibit, but it would do so only at the cost of preventing some desira-
ble transactions from taking place. A broader rule subjects parties
who bargain noncollusively and in good faith to the risk that a
court later will find that the buyer paid too little. The uncertainty
such a rule imposes makes debtors and creditors as a group worse
off. When an individual engages in a financial transaction with
multiple parties (as in the case of an insider guarantee or a lever-
aged buyout), the transaction generally should not be viewed as a
fraudulent conveyance provided that the transferee parted with
value when he entered into the transaction and that the transac-
tion was entered in the ordinary course."
55. This conclusion is reached with respect to insider guarantees in Comment, supra
note 13.
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